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In 1995, World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin famous-ly prophesied the following: “If the wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over 
water.”  Since the middle of the twentieth century, disagreements 
between the Republic of Turkey, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the 
Republic of Iraq over the usage of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers 
have been frequent.  This conflict over water will likely escalate by 
2025, when Turkey—the nation in which the sources of both riv-
ers are located—will suffer from water shortages of its own.  This 
could lead to protests and low-level conflict among the citizens of 
the respective nations and even to a full-scale war between Turkey, 
Syria, and Iraq.  Syria, whose relations with Turkey are consider-
ably strained, may seek to mobilize the Kurds of Turkey against 
the Turkish Government, citing the destruction of the Kurdish 
territory as an appropriate cause for an uprising.  The mobiliza-
tion of the Kurds would give Syria a powerful hand in a potential 
conflict by turning a sizeable minority population against its own 
government.  This future shortage of water—in conjunction with 
Turkey’s pro-Western and pro-Israeli ideals, seen as early as 1948, 
when Turkey was the first Arab nation to recognize the State of 
Israel—suggests that there is a high likelihood that a war among 
the three nations will occur.
Classical realism can be used to frame the looming Euphrates-
Tigris conflict, specifically considering Thucydides’ belief that “the 
strong [Turkey] do what they have the power to do and the weak 
[Syria, Iraq] accept what they have to accept” (Doyle 83).  Though 
states in the Middle East have always faced water shortages, the de-
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crease in water availability as the populations of Turkey, Syria and 
Iraq grow makes the probability of war among the three nations 
increasingly high.  As such, Turkey must keep its riparian neigh-
bors in mind when making policy decisions in order to avoid the 
militaristic balancing that could be exhibited by Syria and Iraq.  
Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Development Project (GAP) 
has amplified disagreements over water in an unstable region al-
ready facing water shortages.  This paper argues that Turkey’s enor-
mous and costly plan to generate electricity, improve irrigation, and 
redevelop its southeastern region under the GAP has failed.  I will 
examine this “hydropolitical security complex,” as Michael Schulz 
describes it, by focusing on the effects of the GAP, Turkey-Syria re-
lations, and Syria’s support of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
since the 1980s (Schulz 91).  Relations between Turkey and Iraq 
have also been affected by the GAP, but additionally by the recent 
Gulf War and U.S. involvement in the region, and a discussion of 
Turkey-Iraq relations is beyond the scope of this paper.  The struc-
ture of this text is as follows: first, a discussion of the Euphrates 
and Tigris rivers themselves; second, the importance of water to 
the Middle East in general and to Turkey, Syria, and Iraq specifi-
cally; third, a look at the GAP and several of its dams; fourth, the 
effects of the GAP project; fifth, Turkey-Syria relations and the 
interplay between water and the PKK; and finally, the future of 
Turkey-Syria relations and the steps that must be taken in order to 
prevent a war over water.  
THe eupHraTes-Tigris river Basin 
The euphrates river
Turkey is the nation farthest upstream on both the Euphra-
tes and Tigris rivers. It is well known for being water-rich, while 
its riparian neighbors, Syria and Iraq, are petroleum rich. The Eu-
phrates River is the longest river in southwest Asia west of the In-
dus.  Its source is in eastern Turkey, where it flows through the 
rest of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq until it combines with other bodies 
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of water to form the Shatt al-Arab waterway, an extremely crucial 
chokepoint that flows into the Persian Gulf.  Control of the Shatt 
al-Arab has been the focal point of many conflicts in the Middle 
East, including the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War.  Two tributaries, 
the Karasu and the Murat, form the Euphrates River.  The Karasu 
is located north of Erzurum; the Murat is located on the slopes of 
Mount Ala, which is north of Lake Van in eastern Turkey.  The 
two tributaries join northwest of Elazig to form the Euphrates and 
to cut through the Taurus Mountains, which divide the Mediter-
ranean coast from the Anatolian plateau in southern Turkey.  The 
river then cuts into Syria at Karkamis, which is downstream from 
Turkey’s Birecik.  After flowing southeast across Syria, the Euphra-
tes reaches its delta near Hit in Iraq.  Near Nasiriya, the river turns 
into channels.  While some drain into Lake Hammar; the rest join 
the Tigris River near Qurna to form the Shatt al-Arab, which com-
bines with the Karun River and finally enters the Persian Gulf (Ko-
lars and Mitchell 1-4).
 
The Tigris river
The Tigris River is the second longest river in southwest Asia. 
It originates in eastern Turkey near Lake Hazar and flows south-
east to Cizre.  It then flows through Syria for 32 kilometers before 
flowing into Iraq.  Between Tikrit and Samarra, the river enters its 
delta and forms “the eastern part of the complex Tigris-Euphrates 
system, which both waters and drains the lowlands of Mesopota-
mia,” according to Kolars and Mitchell (6). Numerous tributaries 
enter the Tigris during its flow through Iraq. It then joins with the 
Euphrates River near Qurna and continues as the Shatt al-Arab for 
179 kilometers until it reaches the Persian Gulf (6).
The History: dams, Hydroelectric power generation, 
and irrigation in Turkey
The usage of dams dates back to ancient times, as early as 3000 
B.C.E.  In Turkey, these systems were mainly urban water works, 
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unlike the irrigation and flood control systems that existed in Egypt 
and Mesopotamia (Kolars and Mitchell 8).  However, Turkey’s de-
sire to utilize its water resources for the generation of power began 
in 1935, with the creation of the Electrical Resources Survey and 
Development Administration.  This independent agency was cre-
ated to survey water resources in Turkey to find those suitable for 
generation power and producing electricity (Turan 192).  Shortly 
after World War II, Turkey began to align itself with the West and 
used the United States’ funds and international agencies to stimu-
late economic development.  The General Directorate of State Hy-
draulic Works (DSI) was established in 1953 with the mission of 
constructing dams for power generation and irrigation.  İlter Turan 
notes that the DSI has played an immense role in the “development 
and utilization of Turkey’s water resources from its very beginning” 
(Turan).  Until 1950, Turkey possessed only three dams with stan-
dard irrigation or power generation capabilities.  The numbers have 
risen drastically since then: six more dams in the 1950s, twenty-
six from 1960–1969, thirty-one from 1970–1979, sixty-nine from 
1980–1989, and thirty-seven from 1990–1997 (Turan). 
Turkey’s use of hydroelectric power generation was an initia-
tive in response to the temporary military takeover of Turkey in 
1960.  The leaders of this takeover supported drastic industrializa-
tion coupled with economic planning.  Though Turkey has, over the 
past century, adopted a very pro-Western foreign policy, it chose to 
“reduce dependence on the outside world,” resulting in the decision 
to “emphasize the utilization of domestic sources for the genera-
tion of power” (Turan 193). This outlook is also one of the factors 
that influenced Turkey’s original desire to fund the entire project by 
itself.  The Keban Dam, completed in 1975, is one of the best ex-
amples of early hydroelectric power generation in Turkey.  It nearly 
doubled the electricity produced in Turkey at the time (194).
Turan holds that five factors contributed to Turkey’s imple-
mentation of irrigation projects.  First, rapid population growth af-
ter World II led to an increased demand for food.  Irrigation served 
to boost agricultural production.  Second, loss of land, due to im-
port substitution-oriented industrialization, led to “conversions in 
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land use where prime agricultural land was often taken over by in-
dustrial users” (195). Third, industrialization led to the need for 
more raw materials.  Fourth, economic reforms from 1980-1983 
made “irrigation more important in the minds of the bureaucrats 
traditionally involved in the making of water policy” (196). Fifth, 
population growth led to “socioeconomic and political patholo-
gies, for which the expansion of irrigated farming was perceived 
as a cure” (Turan). The brief history of dams, hydroelectric power 
generation, and irrigation given above is an adequate starting point 
for the discussion of the Atatürk and Ilisu Dams, two of the most 
controversial dams in the Southeastern Anatolia Development 
Project because of their sheer size and impact upon neighboring 
communities. 
THe souTHeasTern anaTolia developmenT projecT
Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Development Project (GAP) 
is one of the largest dam and development projects in the world. 
It is comprised of twenty-two dam projects combined with nine-
teen hydropower plants in the southeast region of the country. 
The Kurds who call this region home have been struggling with 
the Turkish Government for autonomy for years.  Consequentially, 
it would be difficult for the Turkish Government to influence the 
regional reaction to its GAP project, regardless of its impact.  Thus, 
the GAP has a human development facet that includes “economic 
and social quality-of-life improvements, such as transportation, 
non-farm employment opportunities, and improved education 
and health services” (Kolars and Mitchell 19).  Turkey’s intentions 
for the project, other than electricity production, were to stop pe-
riodic flooding, create electricity, irrigate dry cultivated areas, and 
reduce poverty and underdevelopment in Turkey (Schulz 99).  The 
project was initiated in 1977 by the DSI at an estimated cost of 
$32 billion.  The projected date of completion was originally 2010, 
but is now 2047 due to financial issues (Sahan et al.).  As of 2006, 
only fifty percent of the GAP project had been completed, and the 
Turkish government needed an additional $16 billion to finish it 
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(Benmayor).  The GAP region spans nine provinces in the south-
east of Turkey: Adiyaman, Batman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Kilis, 
Mardin, Siirt, Sanliurfa, and Sirnak.  This land constitutes 9.7 per-
cent of the total territory of Turkey (“General Information of GAP 
and Ataturk Dam”).  Residents of the region represent about ten 
percent of Turkey’s total population.  The GAP is expected to dou-
ble Turkey’s annual production of hydroelectric power and to ir-
rigate 1.7 million hectares of land in the southeast region (Sansal). 
Though the project’s proposed irrigation and hydroelectric power 
plans will benefit the region, the project may also reduce Euphrates 
water flow to Syria by forty percent and to Iraq by up to eighty 
percent (Berman 3).  These figures suggest that Turkey will be re-
sponsible for much of the decrease in quantity of water per capita 
in both Syria and Iraq.  As the nation in control of the headwaters 
of both rivers, Turkey has a duty to consider the external effects of 
its actions.  
atatürk dam
Work on the Atatürk Dam began in 1983 and was completed 
in 1990.  It is one of the largest dams in the world, and is seen 
as the focal point of the entire GAP project.  The Atatürk Dam 
is located on the border of the Adiyaman and Sanliurfa provinces 
on the Euphrates River.  It has an embankment 605 feet high and 
5,971 feet long.  Water from the river is fed to power-generating 
units with a capacity of 2,400 megawatts (Sansal).  The creation of 
the Atatürk Dam was one of Turkey’s earliest efforts to subtly ma-
nipulate its neighbors.  Turan points out that the start of construc-
tion was meant to coincide with the high point of the Iran-Iraq 
War, which, having neutralized Iraq and also Syria, prevented both 
from directly resisting the project (199).  The construction of the 
Atatürk Dam led Syria to support the PKK prior to its denuncia-
tion of the group in the late 1990s as a means of resisting Turkey’s 
claim over the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers.  
Continuing its policy of not supporting projects where ripar-
ian states had not formed an agreement, the World Bank refused 
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to give financial support to Turkey for the construction of the dam. 
This policy was reinforced by World Bank Policy 7.50 for Projects 
on International Waterways (1994) and by the United Nations 
1997 Watercourses Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Waters.  Policy 7.50 offered a statement from the 
World Bank, holding that it would not support projects opposed 
by riparian states (Sahan 31).  The UN Convention of 1997 em-
phasized a need for “agreement between watercourse states to avoid 
conflict” (UN General Assembly).  The Convention states that 
“Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse 
in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the 
causing of Significant Harm to other Watercourse States…In the 
case of the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers, Turkey has not ratified [this] 
treaty and both Syria and Iraq have protested” (UN General As-
sembly 3).  Though the filling of the Atatürk Dam in 1990 caused 
a significant shortage of water in Syria and Iraq, Turkey, however, 
did notify both nations of its intent. 
ilisu dam 
The contract for the controversial Ilisu Dam was signed in 
August 2007.  The dam will be built on the Tigris River, forty-
five kilometers from the Syrian border, and will take seven years 
to complete.  It will be Turkey’s second largest reservoir and fourth 
largest in terms of electricity production.  The reservoir will con-
tain eleven billion cubic liters, power six 200-megawatt generators, 
and have a generating capacity of 3,833 billion kilowatts (Turkish 
Daily News, “Contract over controversial dam to be signed today”). 
This project is highly controversial because it will flood the area of 
Hasankeyf, a culturally important ancient city where an archeolog-
ical dig is currently taking place.   Furthermore, the dam will force 
fifteen to twenty thousand Kurds from fifty-two villages and fifteen 
towns to resettle (Warner).  The pressure that Kurds in Turkey 
and in other Arab nations could put on the Turkish government 
in response may create even more of a rift between Turkey and its 
Kurdish minority population.   
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The downside
Negative effects of the GAP project fall into four categories: 
environmental damage, health hazards, consequences for cultural 
preservation, and domestic politics.  The Illisu reservoir will signifi-
cantly reduce the auto-purification capacity of the Tigris, prevent-
ing it from cleansing itself of the solid waste and wastewater that it 
receives from major cities (Bosshard).  Excessive irrigation has led 
to an increase in salinization, and four million hectares out of the 
entire 7.4-hectare GAP region now have a problem with increased 
bedrock exposure.  Soil erosion affects 72.3 percent of the region 
(Sahan 7).  The Illisu reservoir may also infest the region with wa-
terborne illnesses such as malaria and leishmaniosis (Bosshard 4).
As mentioned above, the Ilisu Dam will flood Hasankeyf, 
which is the only town in Anatolia that has survived intact since 
the Middle Ages.  The city was awarded complete archeological 
protection by the Turkish Department of Culture on April 14, 
1978 (Bosshard 4).  This clearly presents a problem.  The Ilisu 
dam will violate the Turkish government’s prior decision regard-
ing regional protection of Hasankeyf.  Furthermore, GAP as a 
whole has led to severe domestic tension in the southeast.  In April 
2008, an argument over water led to the murder of five brothers. 
Ali Karakecili, a family member of the murdered brothers, told the 
Turkish Daily News that the GAP promised water, wealth, and 
development to the region, but that if appropriate measures are not 
taken, the situation could end in a proverbial blood bath: “instead 
of sending money, more focus should be paid to education” (Turk-
ish Daily News).  One hundred people drowned in the latter half 
of the 1990s in irrigation canals.  Furthermore, the Birecik Dam 
submerged forty-six settlements under water.  The project also af-
fects women in the region, who cannot inherit land or property and 
are therefore unable to receive individual compensation during re-
settlement.  As of 2001, resettlement was necessary for nine dams; 
eighty-eight subvillages, four districts, and a town were affected by 
the GAP project.  Eighty-seven percent of the families resettled 
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themselves, and only thirteen percent wanted government-assisted 
resettlement (Sahan 8-9). 
The GAP project aims to redevelop Southeastern Anatolia, 
but is doing much harm in the process.  The fact that only 13 per-
cent of families desired government-assisted resettlement proves 
that many Turkish citizens distrust their own government.  Need-
less to say, Turkey has a serious problem on its hands that must be 
delicately handled, lest a conflict with its riparian neighbors or civil 
war occurs.  
THe role of diminisHing WaTer resources
In order to understand Turkey’s motives to pursue the GAP, 
it is important to recognize both the world’s need for water and the 
effects of population growth.  As Turkey’s population continues to 
grow exponentially, the government needs to find ways to deliver 
water to its citizens.  Projects like the GAP provide one way to 
deliver water for irrigation, production, and consumption. 
The severe impact of population growth is made clear in a 
2000 report written by the U.S. National Intelligence Council and 
scientific experts, which concluded that “by 2015, nearly half of the 
world’s population—more than three billion people—will be in 
countries lacking sufficient water, and that even more genetically 
modified crops or projects to desalt sea water will not substantially 
help” (Sciolino).  The gravity of this situation only increases after 
considering that many of Turkey’s landlocked neighbors rely on 
Turkey to provide them with access to fresh water.  While most 
nations in the Middle East mainly use water for consumption and 
irrigation, Turkey’s GAP seeks to use water for both irrigation and 
energy production.  
As of 1999, the Middle East and North Africa were home to 
five percent of the world’s total population but held only 0.9 per-
cent of global water resources (Berman and Whibey).  Ilan Berman 
and Paul Michael Whibey underscore the severity of this situa-
tion: “the number of water-scarce countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa has risen from 3 in 1955 (Bahrain, Jordan, and Ku-
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wait) to 11 by 1990 (with the inclusion of Algeria, Israel and the 
Occupied Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, the 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen).  Another 7 are anticipated to 
join the list by 2025 (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Oman 
and Syria)” (Berman and Whibey). The lack of fresh water in the 
region has already reached a crisis-like state and has contributed to 
several conflicts, including the Iran–Iraq War, which in part was 
fought over control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, among other 
factors including the threat Iraq faced from the Iranian revolution 
of 1979.  The Iran–Iraq War proved to be a struggle for hegemony 
in the Gulf Region.  The same situation may occur as a result of in-
creasing tension between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over water rights. 
Turkey’s population expanded from 21 million in 1950 to 56.5 
million in 1990 and 70 million today.  Syria and Iraq are growing 
apace.  This “[implies] increased water requirements” (Berman 95). 
Turkey’s regional obligations are twofold: first, to provide water for 
its own people and redevelop southeastern Anatolia, and second, 
to consider the fate of its neighbors downstream, who already have 
limited access to water.  
The euphrates-Tigris Hydropolitical security complex
Michael Schulz coined the phrase “the Euphrates-Tigris Hy-
dropolitical Security Complex” to describe the manner in which 
Turkey’s control of the headwaters of the Euphrates and Tigris riv-
ers has affected and will continue to affect relations among Turkey, 
Syria, and Iraq.  He believes that water scarcity in regions such as 
the Euphrates-Tigris basin has linked national security with hy-
dropolitics, creating this security complex.  He defines “the hy-
dropolitical security complex” as “including those states that are 
geographically part ‘owners’ and technically users of the rivers and 
further, as a consequence, consider the rivers as a major national 
security issue” (97).  Turkey is both an owner and a user of the 
Tigris and the Euphrates, yet the Turkish government believes its 
riparian neighbors only fall into the latter category.  Syria and Iraq 
both believe they are also “owners,” ignoring the criterion that the 
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state in which the headwaters reside is the only true “owner.”  All 
three nations thus face some sort of threat from this hydro-political 
security complex, which has grown in complexity because of GAP 
and Syrian support of the PKK.
Turkey is known for taking a hard stance on control of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers.  In the summer of 1992, Turkish Prime 
Minister Suleyman Demirel proclaimed: “The water resources are 
Turkey’s. The oil resources are theirs [the Arabs’]. We don’t say we 
share their oil resources; and they cannot say they share our water 
resources” (Kazen and Osman).  Though Turkey has said count-
less times that it would “never use the control of water to coerce 
or threaten,” its control of these headwaters essentially allows it to 
manipulate and even blackmail Syria and Iraq if necessary (Schulz 
119).  Both Syria and Iraq believe that the water should be allocated 
according to a mathematical formula. Turkey, however, rejects the 
use of a formula and appeals to the International Law Commission. 
Syria and Iraq claim historic rights to both the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers but Turkey sees this as irrelevant.  Syria believes that Turkey’s 
“conception of rational usage” should be ignored.  Similarly, Syria 
believes Turkey’s characterization of the water as Turkish (instead 
of international) is contradictory.  Turkey believes in equitable wa-
ter use for all three countries based on studies conducted, criticiz-
ing “the manner in which Iraq and Syria have mutually agreed to 
the amounts of water they want to receive” (El-Fadel, et al.). Fur-
thermore, Turkey states its riparian neighbors have poor water sys-
tems, which would cause water loss. Iraq has had a relatively calm 
response to the situation due to its ability to easily access the Tigris 
River. Iraq also wants to maintain good relations with both Turkey 
(in order to “market its oil to the West) and Syria (“due to its own 
Kurdish problem”).  Syria, however, holds that Turkey violated in-
ternational law (El-Fadel, et al.).  
Although Turkey has relatively high water wealth in compari-
son with Syria and Iraq, the Turkish government claims that it is, 
in fact, not rich with water resources.  As such, amid these mount-
ing pressures, it is unlikely that Turkey will change its position.  A 
study conducted by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
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the Department of Regional and Transboundary Waters in 1996 
sought to debunk the myth concerning Turkey’s possession of wa-
ter in order to ease tension between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.
The study noted that Turkey’s average annual surface runoff 
is close to 186 billion cubic meters, while the amount actually avail-
able for consumption is only 110 billion cubic meters, including 
twelve billion cubic meters of groundwater.  As of 1995, Turkey’s 
population was roughly sixty million, leaving the amount of water 
per capita at 1,833 cubic meters.  Countries that are objectively rich 
in water resources have between 8,000 and 10,000 cubic meters of 
water per capita every year, according to the study; therefore, “the 
available water per capita in Turkey is about one-fifth of the water-
rich countries.” The study concludes, “the impression that Turkey 
has excess water derives from the fact that it is not at present in 
a position to fully utilize its water resources” (Department of Re-
gional and Transboundary Waters).  The study presents the follow-
ing table to compare water quantities per capita in some water-rich 
and Middle Eastern countries:
According to the table, as the study notes, Iraq possesses a 
larger quantity of water per capita than Turkey as of 1993.  The 
study fails to mention, however, that by 2020 Iraq will have lost 
more than half of its quantity of water per capita than Turkey 
(Wolf ). Moreover, Turkey will have slightly more water than Iraq 
and Syria.  Turkey must pursue water development programs with 
its neighbors in order to sustain human development throughout 
the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, not just in Turkey. 
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Turkey-syria relaTions
While the hydropolitical security complex concerns all three 
nations, Turkey-Syria relations are the most prone to violence.  For 
most of the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey-Syria relations were a strug-
gle for relative gains in political and regional power.  Each nation 
had its own tool for manipulating and indirectly pressuring the 
other; Turkey used its control of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, 
and Syria supported the PKK. When Syria officially denounced 
the PKK at the end of the 1990s, it lost its means of resisting Tur-
key’s GAP through domestic terrorism.  That decade also saw a 
dramatic increase in Turkey’s military capabilities. Turkey’s moder-
ate alliance with Israel is also extremely threatening to Syria, which 
has been trying to reclaim the Golan Heights since the 1967 War. 
While examining the hydropolitical security complex that exists 
between Turkey and Syria, it is important to look at the Kurds and 
the PKK, and briefly to discuss the possibility of conflict between 
both nations.  
regional dynamics of kurdish politics
The Kurds are the largest non-Turkish ethnic group in Tur-
key. They primarily reside in eleven provinces in the southeast 
region, though there are Kurdish villages throughout the rest of 
Turkey.  Though the size of the Kurdish population has never been 
accounted for because the Turkish government does not consider 
them to be a separate ethnic group, a 1995 estimate placed the 
number of Kurds in Turkey anywhere from six million to twelve 
million (Metz). About half of all Kurds live in Turkey; the rest live 
in Iran, Iraq, and Syria, among other places. Kurds are thus con-
sidered the only minority group that could truly threaten Turkish 
national unity, power, and policy.  As such, the Turkish government 
has tried to assimilate the Kurds through language suppression but 
has been unsuccessful (Metz).
Formed in the late 1970s by Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK is 
a “terrorist organization” that originally “condemned the repressive 
1 langer  •  Hydro Wars
exploitation of the Kurds” and supported a revolution to overthrow 
the Turkish government (Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 1).  The PKK 
intended to set up a “democratic and united Kurdistan” influenced 
by Marxism and Leninism (Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 1-2).  The 
PKK’s first organized attack was on August 15, 1984, when it co-
ordinated twin attacks in Eruh and Semdinli soon after Turkey re-
verted to democracy.  The PKK’s frequent attacks led newspapers 
to begin using the word “Kurd” for the first time.  In general, the 
attacks opened people’s eyes to the political and economic problems 
in the Kurdish provinces (Metz).  Alan Makovsky notes the PKK’s 
impact in Turkey: “No issue is more emotional to Turks than that 
of the PKK. The separatist group has assaulted Turkey’s territorial 
integrity, wounded its pride, and shed the blood of thousands of its 
citizens. According to a Turkish government estimate published in 
November 1997, more than 35,000 people have died in the fight-
ing” (Makovsky).  In 1987, the PKK killed twenty-four people, 
including fourteen children, in a village in Turkey’s Siirt province. 
The PKK kidnapped and killed 217 teachers between 1984 and 
1987 by shooting, hanging, or suffocating them.  It has been re-
sponsible for the destruction of the rural education system through 
its burning rural schools.  Between 1996 and 1999, it carried out 
sixteen suicide bomb attacks.  By the end of the 1990s, over 3,600 
schools closed in the region due to attacks and arson, and about 
100,000 students could not be educated.  Illiteracy rates in south-
eastern Turkey are still extremely high.  The PKK is also accused of 
burning medical clinics and causing the deaths of countless doctors 
and nurses (Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 3). 
Since the end of the Cold War, the PKK and the Turkish 
government have competed to win the favor of the Kurds, who 
have become somewhat of a political and regional football because 
their allegiance affects whether or not the Turkish government can 
face minimal opposition in its pursuit of the GAP.  The fall of the 
Soviet Union led Öcalan to change the PKK’s goal from commu-
nism to one of Kurdish nationalism.  The PKK adopted an Islamic 
outlook, “taking advantage of Islam’s appeal to conservative Kurds” 
(Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 3).  The Turkish government, on the oth-
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er hand, has tried to use its human development program to appeal 
to the Kurds. This is the route that Turkey should pursue under 
the GAP, while forming more moderate hydro-development plans 
with its neighbors.  
syria’s proxy War and Turkish Brinksmanship
Syria’s support for the PKK dates back to the late 1970s, 
when the organization was supported by the Soviet Union and 
Syria “in the polarized world of Cold War politics” (Cagaptay and 
Yegenoglu  2).  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, PKK training 
camps were built in Syria and Syria-occupied Lebanon.  Syria shel-
tered Öcalan while he was living there, though it explicitly denied 
that he was residing in Damascus.  In early 1998, however, Öca-
lan gave an interview to a Washington D.C.-based journal at his 
home in Damascus (Cagaptay and Yegenoglu 4).  By the latter half 
of 1998, Turkey adopted the technique of brinkmanship to force 
Syria to denounce its support of the PKK.  Turkish troops reached 
the Syrian border and directly threatened Syria with war.  Turkish 
newspapers even had headlines reading, “We will soon say shalom 
to the Israelis on the Golan Heights,” implying that Turkey would 
campaign through Syria until it reached Israeli territory (Cagaptay 
and Yegenoglu  4).  Damascus immediately expelled Öcalan.   Tur-
key and Syria signed the Adana Accord on October 20, 1998, in 
which Syria promised to cease the following activities within its ter-
ritory: PKK propaganda, the supply of weapons and logistical and 
financial support to the PKK, PKK commercial enterprises, the 
establishment of PKK camps and “other (PKK) facilities for train-
ing and shelter,” entry of PKK members or their transit to third 
countries, and the presence of PKK leader Öcalan (Makovsky 3). 
Since the Adana Accord, Syria has made a serious effort to repair 
relations with Turkey, including sentencing several PKK members 
to thirty months in prison in June 2005 (Makovsky 7).  Further-
more, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad has taken greater steps to 
improve Turkey-Syria relations since the death of his father and 
former President Hafiz in 2000.  
1 langer  •  Hydro Wars
The future of Turkey-syria relations and gap
Though the tension stemming from Syria’s indirect support 
of the PKK has cooled since 1998, war between Syria and Turkey 
still looms, as the region’s population grows and water resources 
dwindle.  Should diplomatic proceedings between both nations 
fail, Syria might consider war with Turkey as a means of secur-
ing water for its citizens.  Turkey would defend both its people 
and its resources from a potential Syrian offensive.  As mentioned 
earlier, Turkey improved its military drastically throughout the 
1990s, more than doubling its expenditure on military equipment 
between 1985 and 1996.  It acquired about 200 fighter jets and 
nearly 1,000 M-60 tanks through US support.   Furthermore, the 
Turkish economy grew in the 1990s with Turkey’s GDP tripled 
from 1980 to 1999 (Makovsky 4).  Syria, on the other hand, has 
weakened since the end of the Cold War.  The West and Israel be-
lieve Syria has plans for the production of nuclear weapons, and 
Israel destroyed a building in Syria in September 2007 believed to 
be a nuclear weapons facility.  The slightest conflict between Turkey 
and Syria could potentially lead to massive destruction, especially 
if Syria were to seek a nuclear Iran as an ally.  Furthermore, other 
nations may be dragged into war in order to defend their allies. 
Though Turkey has delivered its promise to provide 500 cubic me-
ters/s of water annually to Syria, there is still a demand for more 
water.  According to an article in the Turkish Daily News on Janu-
ary 3, 2008, Syria asked Turkey for more water to help it “combat 
the country’s drought problem” (Turkish Daily News, “Syria Asks 
for More Euphrates Water”).
  
The new “face” of the gap 
Financial technicalities and protests have muddled Turkey’s 
efforts to complete the GAP in recent years.  Instead of concen-
trating solely on hydroelectric production and irrigation, the GAP 
seems to have taken on a new face—one that supports regional re-
1Journal of Politics & Society • Web Supplement
development and seeks to improve the quality of life in Southeast-
ern Anatolia, especially in the wake of a destructive conflict with 
the PKK (Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development 
Administration).  It seems as though the Turkish government has 
seen the faults in its project and intends to correct them.  Turkey 
must continue along this path in order to both redevelop the south-
east and prevent conflict with Syria and Iraq.  The new Ilisu Dam 
on the Tigris River will greatly affect Iraq, though the Iraqi govern-
ment has tried its best to remain relatively neutral.  The dam will 
require the forced resettlement of close to 34,000 people—many 
of whom are Kurds—and could negatively affect the lives of up to 
78,000 people (Smith).
Turkey has also sought and received World Bank support 
for its non-GAP and water-related regional development plans. 
As of 2006, Turkey issued grants for two infrastructure develop-
ment projects: the Saliniurfa-Harran Plains On-Farm and Village 
Development Project and the GAP Urban Planning Sanitation 
Project.  In June of 2004 the World Bank supported the Anatolia 
Watershed Rehabilitation Project, “promoting sustainable natural 
resource management in twenty-eight microcatchments in Anato-
lia and Turkey’s Black Sea Region [to help] reduce environmental 
damage and raise incomes of communities affected by resource deg-
radation” (World Bank, “Turkey Receives Support for Watershed 
Rehabilitation”).  In March 2005, many countries in East Europe, 
including Turkey and the European Commission began working 
together to create a regional energy market called the Energy Com-
munity of South East Europe (ECSEE), supported by the World 
Bank (World Bank, “Energy Community of South East Europe 
APL No. 2 Turkey”).  In April 2007, the World Bank helped Tur-
key implement the Electricity Distribution Rehabilitation Project, 
to “help improve the reliability of power supply to consumers in 
Turkey supporting the implementation of the electricity distribu-
tion network rehabilitation and expansion program” (World Bank, 
“Electricity Distribution Rehabilitation Project”).  If we examine 
the Euphrates-Tigris hydropolitical security through a realist lens, 
it seems as if the Turkish Government is taking a more liberal (and 
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better) approach to fixing the GAP’s inability to create electricity, 
improve irrigation, and redevelop its southeastern region in order 
to secure the national interests of Turkey and refrain from tipping 
the balance of power in the region.   
The GAP program has negatively impacted Syria, Iraq, and 
even Turkey itself since it began construction on the Atatürk Dam 
in 1983.  The effects of the project are vast and reach all areas of life, 
from the destruction of historical landmarks and Kurdish settle-
ments to the deprivation of crucial water resources in Syria and 
Iraq.  Increasing water shortages in the Middle East will almost 
certainly lead to conflict between Turkey and its neighbors by the 
middle of the twenty-first century.  This hydropolitical security 
complex must be directly addressed by all three countries, and will 
require forceful mediation on the part of groups such as the United 
Nations.  The United States, the European Union, and the United 
Nations must demonstrate to Turkey that a looming water war is 
both very serious and real.  Turkey must continue to pursue alter-
native means of energy production and irrigation through projects 
supported by the international community—projects that do not 
violate World Bank and United Nations policy or human rights. 
The “quality of life” dimension recently adopted is a good starting 
point for Turkey. Turkey, Syria, and Iraq must work together to 
reach an agreement over the water rights of the Euphrates and Ti-
gris Rivers before it is too late. Otherwise, a war for water in the 
Euphrates-Tigris Basin will likely occur.
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